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Abstract：  
Purpose: With the rapid development of economy and the support of government policy, the 
development of the logistics industry has become a new economic growth engine. As we all 
know, the reasonable price of logistics service is the most critical factor for logistics enterprises 
to win market share and make profit. At the same time, the service level is one of the most 
important factors which will influence the size of the market share. Therefore, this paper 
constructs a pricing model considering a situation that the logistics service level affects the 
market demand. This model helps the enterprises to make scientific decisions. 
Methodology: To achieve this objective, this paper constructs the TPL service and the pricing 
decision models based on the game theory. 
Findings: The conclusion shows that under the situation of independent decision-making, the 
enterprise which has strong ability of logistics service does not necessarily have a competitive 
advantage, while pricing equilibrium under the situation of joint decision-making, not only 
make both sides get more income, but also be conducive to improve the level of service.  
Research limitations: In this research, there are some assumptions that might affect the 
accuracy the model such as there are only two TPL enterprises to participate in, and 
considerations are taken under the condition of complete information environment. These 
assumptions can be relaxed in the future work. 
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Originality: In this research, logistics service level is taken account into the areas of logistics 
service pricing, which makes the models more practical and more perfect. And this paper 
constructs game models based on game theory to make up the limitations of traditional pricing 
theories in logistics service pricing. 
Keywords:  TPL, service level; service price, game theory 
 
1. Introduction 
The concept of Third Part Logistics (TPL) originated from 1980s and has developed into a 
certain size of industry in developed countries. Due to the emerging of TPL, the competition 
among TPL becomes fiercer. Intangible services usually have to face up to more uncertain 
market environment compared to tangible productions, and their market demand is not only 
influenced by price standard but also by service level. Boyer and Hult (2005) study  showed 
that logistics service level can directly affect the demand of guests. Therefore, this paper 
assumes that the actual demand of the logistics service in this thesis is about the linear 
function of service price and the provided service level. 
Some achievements of TPL research haven been made since 1980s. In summary, it can be 
divided into two aspects: first are the studies out the similarity of TPL  
which is to elaborate TPL’s concept, its importance and merits and flaws. For instance, Boyson 
(1999) believes that enterprises can reduce costs rapidly by delegating logistics business to 
the professional TPL service companies; Berglund (1998) believes that storage, process, 
transportation and other TPL services can achieve economy of scale, while TPL service can 
provide various types of service according to the diversified demands made by guests. 
Recently, while TPL enterprises become increasingly important, Chinese scholars begin to pay 
attention to TPL, and most of their studies are carried out from angle of TPL similarity. Second 
are studies on pricing TPL services. Lambert, Emmerlhainz and Gardner (1999) found that 
reasonable logistics service price is a key factor in a successful cooperation relationship; Albert 
and Ha (2004) analyzed how to make decisions on price and delivery to win the favor of the 
guests under the circumstances of competition and non-cooperation between two delivery 
service suppliers; Alberto and Giulio (2011) proved that maintenance cost of warehouses is 
correlated to the performance of the logistic service; Weijers, Glöckner and Pieters (2012) 
showed that sustainability is handled by the logistics company as an integral part of the 
corporate strategy. Some Chinese scholars also studied TPL from that aspect: Qi, Jiang and 
Huo (2010) studied the pricing policies of competition and cooperation between TPL companies 
and the subordinate logistics company of port enterprises, and built the advanced Bertrand 
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competition model in competitive relationship, equivalent in consultation and cooperation 
model and remedies cooperation model in cooperative relationship.  
Most studies on the influences of service levels on the variation of market demands are carried 
out from the view of supply chain. For example, Xu, Yu and Zhang (2006) used game model to 
study the supply chain formed by one supplier and one retailer, and respectively explored the 
decisions made by suppliers and retailers on the base of different service providers; Wu and 
Dan (2008) used dynamic game model to study coordinated design of contracts between 
customer companies and TPL service providers in the situation that logistics service level can 
influence product demands of the consumer enterprises.  
2. Model Introduction 
Suppose there are two logistics enterprises supplying service in the market, namely logistics 
enterprise 1 and logistics enterprise 2. Suppose the actual demand of logistics service is 
related to its price and service level. The demand functions of two enterprises are as follow 
respectively: 
1211 HppaD    (1) 
2122 HppaD    (2) 
 
is a alternative coefficient of price, 0,1  ; Assume that the potential market demand scale 
of two logistics enterprises (the price and service level are considered) is equal to a. 
Assume that the relationship between the cost of logistics service and logistics service level is 
a strictly increasing convex function, the relationships between service costs Ci and service 
level Hi are as follow: firstly, the cost of services will raise as the service level increase, and 
the marginal costs will increase too; secondly, the stronger service ability provided, the smaller 
the marginal cost is. Set the relationship of service level and the service cost is: Ci=kHi
2/2, 
 1,2i  ki is a related coefficient of logistics service provider, which reflect the ability of 
logistics enterprise, 1
2
ik  . This second form of cost function is commonly used in the research 
(Xu et al., 2006; Xie & Li, 2008). 1 as the profit of Logistics enterprise 1 and2 as the profit of 
Logistics enterprise 2, then, profit functions of two enterprises are as follow respectively: 
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(3) 
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(4) 
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3. Solution of Nash Game Under Independent Decision 
Assume that two logistics enterprise have equal status in the market, they conduct Nash 
game. In competitive relationship, two logistics enterprises make independent decision and 
determine its service price and service level respectively. 
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Solve the Nash equilibrium by above four formulas, and conclude that two logistics enterprises 
should adopt the pricing strategy and service level are as follow in order to pursue their 
maximum profit when under the completion relationship. 
Conclusion 1: Conduct Nash game under independent decision, pricing and service level of two 
enterprises are such as  below: 
  
    124
12
21
2
21
211
1



kkkk
kak
p


                                         (9) 
  
    124
12
21
2
21
21
1



kkkk
ka
H


                                           (10) 
  
    124
12
21
2
21
121
2



kkkk
kak
p


                                          (11) 
  
    124
12
21
2
21
11
2



kkkk
ka
H


                                         (12) 
Then, their profits are：    
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From the above conclusion 1 we can see: when conduct Nash game, their profit difference only 
caused by the different of the cost. As the two logistics enterprises are in the same authority. 
The relationship of optimal service level and potential market demand scale is a positive linear 
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correlation, that is, when the potential market demand scale increases, two logistics 
enterprises’ optimal service level will increase. 
Deduction 1: p1 and p2,1 and2 are increase function with alternative coefficient  if k1, k2 are 
fixed. It shows that the greater the degree of substitution, the higher price level under Nash 
equilibrium when two logistics enterprises are in monopolistic competition. As k1, k2 are fixed, 
the competition between two enterprises is price, according to the Bertrand price competition 
model, the enterprises will compete to reduce their prices in order to have a bigger share of 
the market, so when the competition is fierce, that  is great, the two enterprises’ original 
price will be higher. Only in this way, the enterprises will have a bigger price cut space under 
the equilibrium level. 
Deduction2:   
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as the difference degree of service level that 
provided by two logistics enterprises, if  is fixed, when H is bigger, then, the difference of 
the equilibrium price  
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 is bigger too. It shows that the service 
price and the service level are related, the higher service level is, the higher price is. 
Deduction 3: (1) when is fixed, if k1=k2, then, p1=p2, H1=H2 and 1=2. It shows that the 
service price and service level will be the same if two enterprises have the same ability to 
provide service when conducting Nash game. In this case, profit level of two logistics 
enterprises are the same. (2) when  is fixed, if k1>k2, then, p1<p2, H1<H2, but profit level of 
two enterprises can not be determined. k1>k2 reflects that the ability to provide service of 
enterprise 2 is stronger than that of enterprise 1, so the service level and the service price are 
higher than that of enterprise 1 too. When two enterprise conduct Nash game under 
independent condition, although logistics enterprise 2 has advantages in service capability, but 
the higher service price makes the profit level not necessarily higher than logistics enterprise 1 
that’s the service ability is weaker, which is accord with the reality condition. 
From the above we can see that: the enterprise which has a strong ability to provide service 
may not have the absolute competitive advantage when it is in a competition condition. The 
reason is that the enterprise which has a strong ability is not willing to focus its energy on 
enhancing the service level, but to get more market share by cutting the price to achieve its 
maximize profit purposes. Next , relation of two logistics enterprises are discussed when they 
are in cooperation condition and compose service union. 
4. Equilibrium Solution Under Joint Decision 
Suppose that two logistics enterprises cooperate and together form a service union, in order to 
achieve win-win objective, they do the behavior such as information sharing ,cost sharing etc.. 
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Under this condition, the pricing decisions and service level are to maximize the total profits. 
The profit function of the whole system is: 
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Consider a first-order we can get: 
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By solving the above four formulas, conclude that two logistics enterprises should adopt the 
pricing strategy and service level below in order to maximize the total profit when under the 
cooperation relationship. 
Conclusion 2: when doing joint decision, pricing and service level of two enterprises are below: 
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Then, their total profits are：    
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Comparing with conclusion 1, we can get: H1
1<H1
2, H2
1<H2
2, p1
1<p1
2, p2
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2 and 1
1+2
1
<, 
then can get the following deduction. 
Deduction 4: (1) Comparing with independent decision, the total profits of joint decision are 
higher than that of independent decision. The following can be obtained: the efficiency of 
competition is lower than the efficiency of cooperating, both sides have the potential incentive 
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to cooperate. (2) Comparing with independent decision, the service level and service price of 
joint decision are higher than that of independent decision. It shows that their goal is to 
maximize the total profits when both are under the cooperation relationship, there is no need 
to lower the price to get a bigger share of the market, instead by improving the service level. 
So the service level and the service price in the cooperation condition are higher than that in 
the competition condition. 
5. Example Analysis 
Assume the market demand function of logistics enterprise 1 is D1=10-p1+0.5p2+H1, the 
market demand function of logistics enterprise 1 is D2=10-p2+0.5p1+H2, command k1=2, k2=1. 
The related results in table 1are as below. 
  Independent decision comparison Joint decision 
Service price of enterprise 1 12 < 40 
Service level of enterprise 1 6 < 20 
Service price of enterprise 2 16 < 50 
Service level of enterprise 2 16 < 50 
Profit of enterprise 1 108 < 200 
Profit of enterprise 2 128 < 250 
Total profits 236 < 450 
Table 1. Related results under independent decision and joint decision 
From the table 1 we can see that the service level has improved when logistics enterprises are 
in joint decision, and the total profits are increased too. So a union between logistics 
enterprises, making a horizontal cooperative, not only can make the enterprise win more 
profits, but also can avoid the monopolistic competition among the industry, which make 
enterprises  intend to improve the logistics service level, and promote the healthy  
development of whole logistics market. We know that variable k1, k2 change will affect the total 
profit, as shown in figure1. 
 
Figure 1. The relationship between the variables k1, k2 and the total profit 
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6. Conclusion and Outlook 
Based on the service system consisted of two logistics enterprises, considering the situation 
that market demand is affected by the level of logistics service, this paper discusses the 
pricing strategies, the determination of the service level as well as coordination and 
cooperation strategy of two logistics enterprises in the independent decision and joint decision, 
and reach the following conclusions by constructing a game model. 
(1) For monopolistic competition, two logistics enterprises in different logistics service level are 
inclining to maximize their own profit by price competition, rather than increasing the service 
level. (2) Enterprises with logistics services higher ability, do not have an absolute competitive 
advantage in their monopolistic competition, so there is no potential incentive for the 
enterprises striving to improve their service level which is not conducive to the development of 
the whole logistics market level. (3) The total profits of two logistics enterprises in joint 
decision are higher than the total profits earned by their own independent decision. The more 
competitive the logistics enterprises are, the more they should cooperate to determine the 
reasonable service level and reasonable pricing. This will not only increase the system's total 
profits, but also can make the choice of logistics services more flexible.  
With the development of TPL enterprises, the scale of the logistics services market is becoming 
larger. The fact is there are much more than two  logistics enterprises in one region, so 
extend the model by considering the reality can be an important direction for future research; 
at the same time, this paper aims to discuss the pricing and coordinating of logistics 
enterprises under complete information, but the logistics services market has become 
increasingly complex, asymmetric information is very often, therefore the pricing of logistics 
companies under incomplete information can be an important work for future research too. 
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